Book V – Chapter I

<p>The futile rejoinders [fallacious opposition] <br /> <br />1. Futilities are as follows: (I) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter example, (13) balancing the non produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the nonreason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the nondifference, (19) balancing the non demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non perception, (22) balancing the non eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect. <br /> <br />.2. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called &quot; balancing the homogeneity &quot; or &quot;balancing the heterogeneity.&quot; <br /> <br />3. The proposition would [should] be established in the same manner as the fact of a certain animal being the &quot;cow&quot; is established by the presence in it of the class character of the &quot;cow.&quot; [Jha] <br /> <br />If the opposition…is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />4. Based upon the difference in the properties of the subject and of the example, there occur (futilities called) &quot;balancing an addition,&quot; &quot;balancing a subtraction,&quot; &quot;balancing the questionable,&quot; &quot;balancing the unquestionable,&quot; and &quot;balancing the alternative&quot;; and based upon the fact that [subject and example] both require proof, there occurs &quot; balancing the reciprocity.&quot; [Revised translation Ed.] <br /> <br />If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing an addition.&quot; <br /> <br />If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing a subtraction.&quot; <br /> <br />If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the questionable.&quot; <br /> <br />If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the unquestionable.&quot; <br /> <br />If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the alternative.&quot; <br /> <br />If one opposes an argument by alleging reciprocity that is, that both subject and example equally require proof of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the reciprocity.&quot; [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />5. This is [or: such arguments are], we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality [similarity] of their characters. <br /> <br />7. If, against an argument based on the co presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non distinguished from or being non conducive to the predicate, be called &quot;balancing the co presence&quot; or &quot;balancing the mutual absence.&quot; <br /> <br />Is it by becoming united with the probandum (proposition) that the Probans (reason) would establish it? Or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it; because by becoming united with it, it would become non differcnt from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and become united, which could be the &quot;probans &quot; (reason), the &quot;establisher,&quot; and which the &quot;probandum&quot; (proposition), the &quot; established&quot;? If, on the other hand, the probans (reason) does not become united with the probandum (proposition) then (on that very account) it could not establish it; … <br /> <br />8. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells. <br /> <br />Neither of the above rejoinders is valid, because there are instances (1) where the cause (the potter) is present with the clay to produce the jar, and (2) where the cause (the exorcist) is absent from the effect (the person whom he kills by means of a spell administered from a distance). <br /> <br />9. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition will be called &quot; balancing the infinite regression &quot; or &quot; balancing the counter-example.&quot; <br /> <br />10. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination. <br /> <br />11. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter example is advanced as the reason. <br /> <br />[or] <br /> <br />If the counter example is an effective reason, the example also cannot but be an effective reason.[Jha] <br /> <br />12. If one opposes an argument on the ground that the property connoted by the reason is absent from the thing denoted by the subject while the subject is not yet produced, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the non produced.&quot; <br /> <br />13. [Answer:] Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the proposition) does then subsist in it, the presence of the ground cannot be denied. [Jha] <br /> <br />14. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non eternal because the example and its genus (or type) are equally objects of perception, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the doubt.&quot; <br /> <br />The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but since the pot is non eternal and pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) is eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non eternal or eternal. [S.B.H., with slight revision.] <br /> <br />15. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus: a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends. <br /> <br />Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) but must be pronounced to be non eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />16. By reason of similarity to both, there arises vacillation(opposition) based upon this reasoning is [&quot;balancing the controversy&quot;].[Jha] <br /> <br />By reason of the similarity (of sound) to both, eternal and non etemal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [i.e., the original proposition as well as its contrary]; this is what is meant by the term I’vaciflation.&quot;… <br /> <br />17. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side. <br /> <br />… The opposition called &quot; balancing the controversy 19 cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side. [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />18. &quot;Balancing the non reason &quot; is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times. <br /> <br />The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot [as a significant reason for the predicate] precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate. [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />19. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign. <br /> <br />… we find that the accomplishing of what is to be accomplished, as also the knowing of what is to be known, is brought about by a cause;… [similarly] the cause [i.e., the reason] is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known. <br /> <br />20. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be <br /> <br />opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times. <br /> <br />… [Similarly] the denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with, what is denied and since there can be no &quot;denial&quot; at all (of the reason urged by the first party), it follows that the reason (being undeniable) is firmly established. <br /> <br />21. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption, <br /> <br />the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the presumption.&quot; <br /> <br />[For examplej the opponent alleges that if sound is non eternal on account of its homogeneity with non eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being incorporeal). [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />22. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid condusion. <br /> <br />. . . If one says that &quot; sound is non eternal because of its homogeneity with non eternal things,&quot; the presumption that naturally follows is that &quot;sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things &quot; and vice versa. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. [S.B.H.] <br /> <br />23. &quot;If the presence of a single (common) property were to make the two things non different, then all things would have to be regarded as non different, because the property of ‘existence’ is present in all &quot;; this contention constitutes [&quot;balancing the nondifferent&quot;]. Uha] <br /> <br />The single (common property, in the case in question, is that of coming after effort; and because this single property is present in sound and in the jar, if these two things be regarded as non different, i.e., both be regarded as &quot;non eternal &quot;; then all things should have to be regarded as nondifferent.. . . <br /> <br />24. The above denial does not hold; because in the case of some (common property) the presence of certain (other properties) of the similar thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is not possible. Uha] <br /> <br />25. [&quot;Balancing the demonstration&quot;] is based upon the presence of grounds for both (views). [Jha] <br /> <br />26. This denial has no force; because the presence of ground in support (of the original proposition) is admitted. Uha] <br /> <br />27. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the perception.&quot; <br /> <br />28. Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to some other cause, the denial has no force at all. Uha] <br /> <br />29. If against an argument proving the non existence of a thing by the non perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non pcrception of the non perception, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the non perception.&quot; <br /> <br />30. The reasoning through non perception is not, we say, sound, because non perception is merely the negation of perception. <br /> <br />32. If by reason of &quot;similarity&quot; two things be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as “non eternal, &quot; this contention constitutes [&quot;balancing the noneternality&quot;]. <br /> <br />&quot; When the first party says that ‘Sound should be regarded as noneternal, by reason of its similarity to the jar, which is non eternal,’ he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non eternal, by reason of their similarity (consisting of existence) to the jar, which is non eternal.&quot;’ <br /> <br />33. If rejection can be based upon &quot;similarity,&quot; there should be rejection also of the denial (set up by the opponent), as there is a similarity between the denial and that which it is sought to deny. <br /> <br />… the said &quot;denial&quot; has this similarity to the original view that both are equipped with the factors of reasoning, proposition and the rest…. <br /> <br />34. What serves as the reason is that property which is definitely known to subsist in the example, as being an infallible indicator of the proposition; and since such a reason can be of both kinds, there can be no non difference (among all things). <br /> <br />35. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non eternal, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the eternal.&quot; <br /> <br />36. Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the &quot; non eternality&quot; in the subject of denial (sound) [is admitted by the opponent], the &quot;non eternality&quot; of the non eternal thing (sound) becomes established; so that there can be no basis for the denial. <br /> <br />37. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effect of efforts, the opposition will be called &quot;balancing the effect.&quot; <br /> <br />. . . &quot; Coming into existence after effort &quot; we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the &quot;manifestation&quot; of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the outcome of effort]; and there is no special reason to show whether sound comes into existence after effort, or there is only manifestation of it (after effort); and the opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the &quot; products of effort,&quot; is [&quot; balancing the effect&quot;]. <br /> <br />38. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect [e.g., manifestation], because there was no cause of non perception. <br /> <br />[or] <br /> <br />Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of sound), as there is not present (in the case of sound) any cause of its non apprehension. <br /> <br /> 39. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too. <br /> <br />… if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word &quot;effect &quot; why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground ?… <br /> <br />40. The same may be said by the first party in answer to all (futile rejoinders). <br /> <br />In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the futile rejoinders e.g., &quot;similarity&quot; and the rest whenever no special corroborative reason may be found the contention way be put forward (by the first party) that both views stand on the same footing. <br /> <br />41. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition. <br /> <br />42. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called &quot;admission of an opinion&quot; [or: &quot;confession of the contrary opinion&quot;]. <br /> <br /> 43. &quot;Admission of an opinion&quot; also occurs when the disputant, instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent’s side as well.</p>