Book II – Chapter II

Examination of the fourfold division of the means of right knowledge [pramanas]

1. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four, because rumour [tradition or hearsay], presumption, probability [deduction], and non existence [antithesis] are also valid.

2. This, we reply, is no contradiction, since rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability, and non existence are included in inference.

3. Presumption, some say, is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty.

4. We reply: if there is any uncertainty, it is due to Our supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so.

Examination of the doctrine of the non eternaliy of sound or words [sabda]

13. Sound is not eternal, because it has a beginning [a cause] and is cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.

14. Some will not accept this argument, because the non existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial.

[E.g., We speak of the part of a self, the part of space, etc., a thing having parts being non eternal, whereas self and space are admitted to be eternal.]

15. There is, we reply, no opposition because there is distinction between what is really eternal and what is partially eternal, [or: between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) denotation of the word "eternal"].

16. It is only the things cognised by our sense as belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred to be non eternal.

… what we mean is that the fact of sound being apprehended through sense contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of sound there is a series of sounds; and this fact … proves that each of these sounds is non eternal.

18. Sound is non eternal, because neither do we per ceive it before pronunciation, nor do wc notice any veil [obstruction] which covers it.

Examination of the nature and potency of words

59. There is doubt as to what a word (noun) really means, as it invariably presents to us an individual, form and genus.

60. Some say that the word (noun) denotes individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can use “that,” “collection,” “giving,” “taking,” ” number,” “waxing,” “waning,” “colour,” “compound ” and ” propagation.”

61. A word (noun) does not denote an individual, because there is no fixation of [restriction to] the latter.

… what is denoted by the word “cow” is not the mere individual by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the universal (to which it belongs), but the individual as qualified by (and along with) the universal.. . .

62. Though a word does not literally bear a certain meaning [referring to an individual], it is used figuratively to convey the same, as in the case of brdhmin, scaffold [platform], mat, king, flour, sandalwood, Ganges, cart, food, and man, in consideration of association, place, design, function, measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance, and supremacy.

What is meant by ” one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that” is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it. For example, in the expression ” feed the stick,” the word “stick” is applied to the brahmin accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of “association.”

63. Some say that the word (noun) denotes form by which an entity is recognised.

64. “Inasmuch as the ‘washing’ etc. (laid down as to be done to the ‘cow’) cannot be done to the ‘cow’ of clay, even though it is endowed with individuality and configuration, it must be the universal (that is denoted by the word).” [Jhal

65. In reply, we say that it is not genus [universal] alone that is meant by a word (noun), because the manifestation of genus depends on the form and individuality.

66. The meaning of a word (noun) is, according to us, the genus, form and individual.

67. An individual is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.

68. The form is that which [indicates or] is called the token of the genus.

69. The “universal” is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition. [Jha]