Re examination of doubt
1. Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately.
2. It is further said that doubt cannot arise, either from conflicting testimony, or from the irregularity of perception and non perception.
3. In the case of conflicting testimony there is, according to them, a strong conviction (on each side).
4. Doubt, they say, does not arise from the irregularity of perception and non perception, because in the irregularity itself there is regularity.
5. Likewise, there is, they say, the chance of an endless doubt, owing to the continuity of its cause.
6. In reply, it is stated that the recognition of properties common to many objects, etc., are certainly causes of doubt, if there is no reference to the precise characters of the objects: there is no chance of no doubt or of endless doubt.
7. Examination should be made in this way of each case where there is room for doubt.
Detailed examination of Perception
21. An objector may say that the definition of perception as given before is untenable, because incomplete.
22. Perception, it is said, cannot arise unless there is conjunction of self with mind.
24. The self, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition, inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the self.
25. The mind, too, has not been omitted from our definition inasmuch as we have spoken of the non simultaneity of acts of knowledge.
26. Inasmuch as it is only the contact of the sense organ and the object that forms the (distinctive) cause (or feature) of perception, it has been mentioned (in the sutra) by means of words directly expressing it. [Jha]
Consideration of the view that perception is the same as inference
31. Perception, it may be urged, is inference, because it illumines only a part as a mark of the whole.
When the observer cognises the tree, what he actually perceives is only its part nearest to himself; and certainly that one part is not the “tree.’ So that (when the man cognises the “tree” as a whole) what happens is that there is an inference of it (from the perception of its one part), just like the inference of fire from the apprehension of smoke.
32. But this is not so, for perception is admitted of at least that portion which it actually illumines.
Examination of the nature of the composite whole
33. There is, some say, doubt about the whole, because the whole has yet to be established.
34. If there were no whole, there would, it is replied, be nonperception of all.
… as for substance in its atomic condition, this could never be an object of perception, as atoms are beyond the reach of the sense organs … and yet as a matter of fact, all these, substance and the rest, are found to be objects of perception, and actually apprehended as such….
35. There is a whole, because we can hold, pull, etc.
If there were no whole, we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say, “one jar,” “one rnan,~l etc. This use of “one” would vanish, if there were no whole.
36. [In answer to what has been just urged by the siddhantin,” the purvapaksin might urge that] “the said conception (of ‘one’ in regard to the many) would be similar to the notion that we have in regard to such (collective) things as the ‘army’ and the ‘forest”‘ ;_ but even so the conception would not be possible; as atoms are beyond the reach of the senses.3 [Jha 37]
Examination of inference
37. Inference, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it errs in certain cases, e.g., when a river is banked, when something is damaged, and when similarity misleads, etc. I
If we see a river swollen, we infer that there has been rain; if we see the ants carrying off their eggs, we infer that there will be rain; and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These inferences, says an objector, are not necessarily correct, for a river may be swollen because embanked, the ants may carry off their eggs because their nests have been damaged, and the so calldd screaming of a peacock may be nothing but the voice of a man.
38. It is not so, because our inference is based on sometbing else than the part, fear and likeness.
… the “falsity” that has been urged does not apply to inference; it is clear that what is not an inference has been mistaken for inference.. . .
Introductory examination of the nature of time, especially the present
39. There is, some say, no present time because when a thing falls, we can know only the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will yet fall.
40. If there is no present time, there will, it is replied, be no past and future times, because they are related to it.
41. The past and future cannot be established by a mere mutual reference.
42. If there were no present time, sense perception would be
impossible, [and therefore no] knowledge would be possible.
Perception is brought about by the contact of the sense organ with the object; and that which is not present … cannot be in contact with a sense organ; …
43. We can know both the past and the future, for we can conceive of a thing as [having been] made and as about to be made.
Examination of analogv (comparison)
44. Comparison, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it cannot be established either through complete or considerable or partial similarity.
45. This objection does not hold good, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree.
Examination of testimony (lit., word) in general
49. Verbal testimony, say some, is inference, because the object revealed by it is not perceived but inferred.
52. In reply, we say that there is reliance on the matter signified by a word [testimony], because the word has been used by a reliable person.
Examination of the Veda [word or testimony] in particular, i.e., scripture
57. The Veda, some say, is unreliable, as it involves [in detail] the faults of untruth, contradiction, and tautology.
58. The so called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice.
59. Contradiction would occur if there were alteration of the time agreed upon.
60. There is no tautology, because reiteration is of advantage.
68. The Veda is reliable like the spell [incantations] and medical science [scripture], because of the reliability of their authors.